On June 21, 2001, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the lower court's holding that the common-law "corrupt or malicious motives" exception limited the immunity granted by the Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 10/1-101 et seq, and that the village could be held liable in quasi-contract.
On May 24, 2001, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and held that no independent cause of action exists in tort for an alleged breach of an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing arising from a contract.
On March 30, 2001, the Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, affirmed the lower court's finding that alcohol-related liability, including social-host liability, has been preempted by the passage of the Dramshop Act.
On March 30, 2001, the seventh circuit affirmed the lower court's finding that a go-kart racer could be held to the terms of a release form which defendants could not produce.
On April 19, 2001, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's holding that § 2-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure violated the special legislation clause, Ill Const Art IV, § 13, and the right to equal protection, Ill Const Art I, § 2, guaranteed by the Illinois Constitution.
On December 29, 2000, the First District of the Appellate Court of Illinois held that the plaintiff employee's alleged demotion did not constitute "discharge" as required of a retaliatory discharge claim, and that Illinois does not recognize a cause of action for retaliatory demotion.
On December 8, 2000, the seventh circuit court of appeals reversed the district court's decision to set aside the jury's verdict in favor of Victor and Tre McNair, two brothers who had instituted a claim of excessive force against Officer Sean Coffey in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
On September 29, 2000, the Second District of the Appellate Court of Illinois reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant on Happel's claim of negligence after she suffered anaphylactic shock resulting from a prescription filled by Wal-Mart's pharmacy.
On September 1, 2000, the second district of the Appellate Court of Illinois reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant, Old Kent Bank, on Harris' claim of negligence for injuries she sustained after tripping and falling on the sidewalk upon exiting the bank.
On May 18, 2000, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision by dismissing a fourth-party complaint for contribution that was based solely on contractual liability when the fourth-party defendants were not parties to the contract in dispute.
